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Blueprint for Reform of VAT Rates in Europe
Rita de La Feria*
Within Europe differentiated rates structures date back to the introduction of VAT itself. Evidence as regards the negative consequences of applying
multiple rates has been apparent for some decades. In this context, since the late 1980s, there have been several attempts to amend European rates
structures under the political guidance of the European Commission. However, the most recent agreed upon amendments to the rates structure have
increased the level of differentiation, rather than decreased it, with more goods and services being subject to reduced rates in Europe today than even
as recently as ten years ago. This reality seems to be changing in the last few years. Since 2008, a staggering twenty-two of the twenty-eight EU
Member State countries have increased their VAT rates, resulting in a broad convergence of VAT standard rates across the EU around the 21%
mark. Furthermore, there has also been a decrease in levels of differentiation with a reduction in number of VAT rates applicable in many Member
States, as well as various base broadening measures. The latest developments seem to indicate that conditions may be present which allow the reversal
of the status quo bias, creating the opportunity for base broadening tax reform. This raises the possibility that European countries might engage in
an involuntary process of convergence of VAT bases, fuelled by domestic necessities. A politically achievable blueprint for reform of VAT rate
structures in European is presented, which would result in a broader-based, and thus more efficient and neutral, VAT. Moreover, application of this
blueprint across EU Member States would have the additional advantage of resulting in further convergence of VAT rate structures in Europe, to
replace the long-sought, but so far unattainable, EU harmonization.
1 VAT RATES IN EUROPE: 1967–20081
The introduction of the European VAT system dates back
to 1967, with the approval of the First and Second VAT
Directives.2 The system put in place under those
Directives, however, established only a basic framework,
leaving a full autonomy to Member States insofar as rates
were concerned: national legislators were free to establish
their own rates structure, including number and level of
rates.3 Primarily for political and practical reasons,
Member States used that freedom therefore to largely
mimic the rates structures applied under their previous
turnover taxes.4 With the approval of the Sixth VAT
Directive in 1977, there was a significant increase on the
level of detail contained as regards the tax base, and a
decrease in the level of freedom granted to Member
States.5 Yet, despite the progress achieved in some areas of
the system, as regards other areas such as the rates
structure, the EC Council of Ministers reportedly found it
impossible to reach agreement and consequently further
harmonization was postponed to a later date. The rules
applicable to rates under the original version of the Sixth
VAT Directive were therefore similar to those previously
applicable under the Second VAT Directive, i.e., there was
total lack of specific rules as regards rates structures. For
that outcome certainly contributed the opposition adopted
by Member States at negotiations – such as France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom – keen to maintain
the domestic application of reduced VAT rates to specific
products.
Notes
* Professor of Tax Law, Durham University; Programme Director, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. This paper was presented at conferences at the University
of Toulouse 1 (October, 2012), at the Basque Tax Authorities, Bibao (June, 2013), at the Academy of European Law – ERA, Trier (November, 2013), and at the University
of Sao Paulo (October 2014). I am grateful to my hosts at all these events, and for comments received therein, as well as for those received from many non-academic tax
colleagues.
1 A longer version of this section has been published in R. de la Feria, ‘EU VAT Rate Structure: Towards Unilateral Convergence?’ in F. Querol (ed.), La réorientation européenne
de la TVA (LGDJ, Presses de l’Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole, 2014).
2 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 Apr. 1967, OJ 71, 14/4/1967, 1301 (hereinafter ‘First VAT Directive’); and Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 Apr.
1967, OJ P 71, 14/4/1967, 1303 (hereinafter ‘Second VAT Directive’).
3 Article 9 of the Second VAT Directive.
4 See R. de la Feria and R. Krever, ‘Ending VAT Exemptions: Towards A Post-Modern VAT’ in R. de la Feria (ed.), VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2013), 3–36. See also S. Cnossen, ‘What Rate Structure for a Value-Added Tax?’ (1982) National Tax J. 35(2), 205–214, at 209; V.
Lenoir, ‘April 1954–April 2004 – VAT Exemptions: The Original Misunderstanding’ (2004) European Taxation 10, 456−459, at 456−457.
5 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977, OJ L 145, 13/6/1977, 1 (hereinafter ‘Sixth VAT Directive’).
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1.1 Towards an Harmonized EU Rates
Structure
In June 1985, the European Commission presented the so-
called White Paper for the completion of the Internal
Market, which laid down a series of measures with a view
to establishing an internal market by 1992. Under the
heading removal of fiscal barriers, the paper contained
several measures in the field of VAT.6 According to the
White Paper a close level of ‘approximation’ within VAT
was required in order to establish a true internal market,
and in particular progress had to be achieved as regards tax
rates. In this context, the European Commission was to
present a proposal, which would deal both with the
number of rates and level of these rates, in particular that
of the standard rate. In the meantime, according to the
White Paper ‘provisions should be adopted which will
exclude the proliferation of VAT rates in Member States,
or the widening of the gap between VAT rates, since this
would make subsequent adjustment more difficult’.7
In 1987, the Commission put forward a proposal for a
new VAT rates structure, which would be compatible with
these objectives.8 This new structure was based on three
basic principles, as follows: dual-rate system; goods and
services compulsorily allocated to each rate; and repeal of
temporary derogations, allowing Member States to apply
reduced rates and zero rates.9 The 1987 proposals were
widely regarded as very ambitious in both their aims and
their prospected methods for achieving these aims.10
Progress in Council discussions proved slow, and by June
1989 the Commission recognized that certain aspects of
the 1987 VAT rates proposal were curtailing the
possibility of reaching agreement.11 It recognized then,
that a more pragmatic approach would be required. The
idea of a transitional phase, which would last beyond 1
January 1993, started to take shape in late 1989. During
the period until 1991, a series of key meetings of the
ECOFIN Council of Ministers took place, from which
emerged the basic shape of was to become known as the
‘transitional VAT system’.
The decision to introduce a VAT transitional system
had serious implications for the discussions on the
harmonization of VAT rates. Rates approximation was still
seen as an absolute necessity if abolition of border controls
was to take place, however, a close approximation such as
the one put forward by the Commission in its 1987
proposal was no longer required. In this context, and with
a view to facilitate agreement within the Council, the
Commission suggested in its Communication the
following alternative rates structure: minimum standard
rate; one reduced rate set between 4% and 9%; and
maintenance of zero-rating for a limited number of
products. This alternative rate structure was significantly
more moderate and less ambitious than the structure
originally proposed by the Commission. However, it was
still over-ambitious for Member States, particularly as
regards the reduced rates regime. In March and June
1991, the Council finally reached agreement on the
essential characteristics of the VAT rate structure, which
was to apply within the context of the new transitional
system. The agreement, which eventually led to the
approval of the Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19
October 1992, known as the Approximation of VAT Rates
Directive,12 not only differed significantly from the
Commission’s original 1987 proposal, but also differed
from the alternative rates structure proposed by the
Commission in its 1989 Communication.
The new VAT rate structure, which would apply from
31 December 1992 onwards, was largely a product of
political compromises and a good example of the victory of
politics over economic efficiency. The price for reaching
agreement was an extremely complex system (mostly if
compared with the simplicity of the structure initially
proposed by the Commission), filled with exceptions and
derogations. Overall, the new rate structure comprised two
types of rules: general rules; and temporary measures,
which in theory would apply only during the transitional
system.
Under the general rules, Member States must apply a
standard rate, which should not be lower than 15%, but
no maximum limit was established. Member States could
also apply either one or two reduced rates, which could not
be lower than 5%. These rates could be applied to a range
of seventeen goods and services listed in what is now
Notes
6 Completing the Internal Market – White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310, 14 Jun. 1985. For a detailed analysis of the VAT measures in the
White Paper see R. de la Feria, The EU VAT System and the Internal Market (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), at 57 et seq.
7 White Paper, n. 6 above, at 52.
8 Proposal for a Council Directive completing the common system of value added tax and amending Directive 77/388/EEC – Approximation of VAT rates, COM(87) 321 final/2, 21 Aug.
1987.
9 See Completion of the Internal Market: approximation of indirect tax structures and harmonisation of indirect tax structure, Global Communication from the Commission, COM(87)
320 final, 5 Aug. 1987.
10 A.J. Easson expressed a widely felt scepticism when he commented: ‘to expect to achieve an alignment of tax rates by 1992, by the end of the century or even by the middle
of the next one, is to be completely unrealistic. The approach which has been exposed by the Commission for the past twenty-five years or so is doomed to fail’, in ‘The
Elimination of Fiscal Frontiers’, in R. Bieber et al. (eds.), 1992: One European Market? A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-Baden: Nomos
Verlagsgesellshaft, 1988), 241–260, at 260.
11 Completion of the Internal Market and Approximation of Indirect Taxes, Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, COM(89) 260
final, 14 Jun. 1989, at 1.
12 Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 Oct. 1992, OJ L 316, 31/10/1992, 1 (hereinafter the ‘Approximation of VAT Rates Directive’).
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Annex III and additionally, under certain conditions, to
the supplies of natural gas and electricity. During the
transitional period, and until the introduction of a
definitive VAT system, Member States were allowed to
maintain and/or introduce measures which derogated from
the general rates’ rules. Under these measures, Member
States were allowed, subject to certain conditions, to:
continue to apply reduced rates lower than the 5%
minimum; continue to apply zero rates; continue to apply
both reduced rates lower than the 5% minimum and zero-
rates to items not listed in Annex III; continue to apply a
reduced rate to restaurant services, children’s clothing,
children’s footwear and housing; and introduce, dependent
on certain requirements, an extra reduced rate, not lower
than 12%.
Table 1 provides a comparative overview of the three
VAT rate structures discussed above.
Table 1 VAT Rate Structures: Comparative Overview
Commission’s 1987
Proposal
Commission’s 1989
Alternative
Proposal
Approximation of
VAT Rates
Directive
Two rates system
(standard rate
and reduced rate)
Two rates system
(standard rate
and reduced rate)
Five rates system
(standard rate,
three reduced
rates and zero
rate)
Standard rate
band
(14%–20%)
Standard rate
minimum
Standard rate
minimum (15%)
Reduced rate
band (4%–9%)
Reduced rate
band (4%–9%)
Reduced rates
minimum (5%)
in theory; in
practice no
minimum
applies
Six items which
may be subject to
reduced rate
Six items which
may be subject to
reduced rate
Twenty-two
items which may
be subject to
reduced rates
Compulsory
nature of list of
goods/services
subject to
reduced rate
Compulsory
nature of list of
goods / services
subject to
reduced rate
Optional nature
of list of goods/
services subject
to reduced rate
Commission’s 1987
Proposal
Commission’s 1989
Alternative
Proposal
Approximation of
VAT Rates
Directive
Abolition of
zero-rating
Maintenance of
zero-rating for a
limited range of
products
Maintenance of
zero-rating
1.2 Post-1992 Failed Initiatives
The VAT transitional system, including the temporary
measures on VAT rates described above, was supposed to
be in place for a period of four years after 1 January 1993.
A time plan was therefore agreed upon according to which
the European Commission would bring proposals forward
by the end of 1994, with a view to implementing a
definitive VAT system based on the origin principle by
1997. Unfortunately, the Commission was unable to fulfil
this time plan and it was not until the summer of 1996
that a work programme was presented for the adoption of
the definitive VAT system.13 Although formal legislative
proposals were never put forward, the programme
contained an outline of the envisaged system, as well as a
detailed work plan extending through to mid-1999.14
Amongst the key features of the definitive VAT system, as
foreseen under that programme, was the further
harmonization of the main aspects of the VAT system
including rates.
This new attempt was too doomed to fail. The first
setback came very soon after the presentation of the 1996
programme, as Member States failed to reach total
agreement on the already tabled proposal regarding the
establishment of a fixed band for standard rates of VAT.
This included a minimum rate of 15% and a maximum
rate of 25% and whilst Member States were able to agree
on the minimum level, it was impossible to reach
unanimity on a maximum level. Ultimately, the proposal
was approved but the final text contained no reference to
the maximum level of standard rate.15 Thus, very little
progress was made on the Commission’s proposed 1996
programme and it soon became clear that the degree of
harmonization necessary for the introduction of a
definitive VAT system (particularly in terms of VAT rates)
would not be achieved.
Notes
13 See A common system of VAT – A programme for the Single Market, COM(96) 328 final, 22 Jul. 1996.
14 This means that in practice even if the proposals presented during this period would have been agreed upon by Member States, the definitive VAT system would not be in
place until 2001 at the earliest, see ibid., at 34.
15 Council Directive 96/95/EC of 20 Dec. 1996, OJ L 338, 28/12/1996, 89.
Intertax
156
1.3 Further Differentiation of Rates
Structures
Since the approval of the Approximation of VAT Rates
Directive, VAT rates, far from converging as might have
been expected,16 can diverge much more than under the
legal framework set up in 1992. As reported by the
European Commission in 2001, despite its tentative
efforts to increase convergence, ‘when current rates are
compared with those applicable in 1997, it is apparent
that rates continue to vary considerably’.17
The main reason for increased rate differentiation
within Europe since 1992 has been the so-called labour-
intensive services experiment. Implemented in 1999, the
experiment allowed the application of reduced rates to
certain labour-intensive services, such as hairdressing and
window cleaning, with the aim of testing its impact on
job creation and the combat against the ‘black market’.18
Initially intended to last for three years, the experiment
was consecutively extended despite disappointing
results.19 A report from the European Commission,
published in 2003, confirmed that the impact of
introducing reduced rates on prices of labour-intensive
services was minimal. When conducting price surveys,
Member States found that reduced rates were only
partially reflected in consumer prices or not at all and that
at least part of the VAT reduction was used to increase the
margins of service providers. Moreover, even where the
VAT reduction had been passed on to the consumers,
Member States found that this was only a temporary
measure and prices would subsequently increase.20
Overall, the study concluded that, partially due to the lack
of effect on prices, the aims of the experiment, namely to
increase employment and to combat the black economy,
had not be achieved.21
Yet, the above results did not prevent Member States
from either further extending the experiment, but
moreover, from transforming the temporary experiment
into permanent measures. In 2008, the European
Commission put forward a new legislative proposal, which
it designated as ‘a first action concerning reduced VAT
rates’ and as a ‘limited legislative proposal […] relating to
urgent issues, which do not require any substantial
additional study’.22 The proposal had two objectives, both
allowing for further differentiation of VAT rates: to make
the possibility of applying reduced rates to certain labour-
intensive services permanent, and to allow Member States
the freedom to apply reduced rates to ‘locally supplies
services’, such as restaurant services. The proposal was
approved not long after its presentation, with the final
legislative document essentially following its wording –
both factors a clear indication that negotiations had been
relatively straightforward, and that Member States were
broadly in agreement with the new direction taken by the
European Commission.23
In the meantime, Commission’s attempts at limiting
overall differentiation failed miserably. In 2003, the
Commission presented a proposal with a view to ‘review
and rationalise the use of reduced rates’. The proposal left
considerably more freedom to Member States to decide on
their own VAT rates structure than under previous
Commission’s proposals, namely the 1987 and 1989
proposals. Obviously, it considered that by allowing
increased freedom, the likelihood of Member States
reaching unanimous agreement at the Council would also
increase. Although not exceedingly ambitious, however,
the proposal did envisage the move to a compulsory
natured list of products which may be subject to reduced
rates, which seems to have been sufficient to cause concern
amongst Member States.24 After years of discussions at the
Council,25 the proposal was finally approved in 2006 but
at significant costs: the emphasis was no longer on
rationalization of reduced rates, but rather on the
Notes
16 This was in fact the Parliament’s opinion, see Options for a definitive VAT system, Working Paper, Economic Affairs Series, E 5, October 1995, at 87. This was also the view
expressed by several authors and Member States’ officials, as reported in P. Guieu and C. Bonnet, ‘Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect Taxation’ (1987) J. of
Common Market Studies XXV(3), 209–222, at 215.
17 See Report from the Commission on reduced VAT rates drawn up in accordance with Article 12(4) of the Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the
Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, COM(2001) 599 final, 22 Oct. 2001, at para. 19.
18 Council Directive 1999/85/EC of 22 Oct. 1999, OJ L277, 28/10/1999, 34.
19 Council Directive 2002/92/EC of 2 Dec. 2002, OJ L 331, 7/12/2002, p. 27; Council Directive 2006/18/EC of 14 Feb. 2007, OJ L345, 28/12/2005, 19–20; Council
Directive 2004/15/EC of 10 Feb. 2004, OJ L52, 21/2/2004, 61.
20 See Experimental application of a reduced rate of VAT to certain labour-intensive services, Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, COM(2003)
309 final, 2 Jun. 2003; and Evaluation report on the experimental application of a reduced rate of VAT to certain labour-intensive services, Commission Staff Working Paper,
SEC(2003) 622, 2 Jun. 2003.
21 Ibid., at 28.
22 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards rates of value added tax, COM(2008) 428 final, 7 Jul. 2008, at 2. This is the sixth formal proposal by
the Commission exclusively on VAT rates (excluding informal suggestions).
23 Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009, OJ L116, 9/5/2009, 18–20.
24 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards reduced rates of value added tax, COM(2003) 397 final, 23 Jul. 2003.
25 See Preparation of Eurogroup and Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, Luxembourg, 6–7 October 2003, MEMO/03/191, 6/10/2003), and 2530th Council Meeting – Economic
and Financial Affairs – Luxembourg, 7 October 2003, C/03/274, Pres/03/274, 7/10/2003 and Results of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, 25th November 2003 –
financial services and taxation, MEMO/03/241, 26/11/2003). During 2005 a substantial push was given to this proposal by both Luxembourg and the United Kingdom –
which held the Presidency of the Council during the first and second half of 2005, respectively, see Results of Council of Economic and Finance Ministers, Brussels, 6–7 December
2004, MEMO/04/289, 8/12/2004, and Results of the 2688th ECOFIN Meeting, Press Release 13678/05, Brussels, 8 Nov. 2005, 21.
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extension of the temporary rates provisions within the VA
Directive, as well as on the extension of the list of
products to which reduced rates may apply.
The 2006 legislation also included a mandate from the
Council to the Commission to present to the European
Parliament and to the Council, by the end of June 2007,
an overall assessment report on the impact of reduced rates
on job creation, economic growth, and the internal
market.26 This mandate has produced quick results. In
2007, the Commission published a study undertaken by
Copenhagen Economics on the economic impact of the
application of reduced rates;27 and in March 2008, it
launched a public consultation as part of its aim of
‘launching a broad debate in the Council, the European
Parliament and with other stakeholders to obtain all
relevant views before initiating a more far-reaching
proposal on reduced rates is the most effective approach to
develop a sustainable and well balanced proposal in the
medium term’.28 For those awaiting the presentation of
this ‘far reaching proposal’, early signs were not
encouraging. As discussed above the European
Commission seemed to be moving in the wrong direction:
not only had the most recent proposal on VAT rates been
aimed at increasing differentiation of rates, rather than the
opposite, but equally the consultation paper expressly
stated that the Commission was considering introduction
of further reduced rates to, amongst others,
environmentally friendly products. As will be seen below,
this approach changed radically in the wake of the
economic and financial crisis.
1.4 State-of-Play in 2008
As discussed above, it is clear that although the provisions
governing the rates structure have been subject to several
amendments since the entering into force of the
Approximation of VAT Rates Directive,29 ‘the situation
has changed little and the level of harmonisation of VAT
rates has remained modest’.30 At present the rates
structure under the VAT Directive is a multiple-rate
system, allowing for a standard rate and one or two
reduced rates in theory (two more in practice), and subject
to a few basic rules, as follows:31
(1) The standard rate cannot be lower than 15% (Article
97 of the VAT Directive).32
(2) Member States may apply one or two reduced rates to
supplies of goods/services specified in Annex III,
including labour-intensive services, but not where
they are electronically supplied (Article 98 of the VAT
Directive).
(3) Subject to certain conditions, reduced rates may also
be applied to supplies of natural gas and electricity
(Article 102 of the Common VAT System Directive),
imports of works of art, collectors’ items and antiques
and certain supplies of works of art (Article 103 of the
VAT Directive).
(4) During the transition period, i.e., until the entry into
force of the definitive VAT system, Member States
may maintain, under certain conditions, various
special measures concerning the application of reduced
rates, including: application of reduced rates lower
than the authorized 5% minimum; maintenance of
reduced rates for goods or services not covered by
Annex III; or application of an additional reduced rate,
known as the ‘parking rate’, no lower than 12%
(Articles 109–122 of the VAT Directive).
(5) Finally, some Member States have been allowed to
temporarily apply reduced rates to specific
transactions (Articles 123–130 of the VAT Directive),
and special rules also apply to specific EU regions
(Articles 104 and 105 of the VAT Directive).
The described rules leave Member States significant
freedom to establish their own rates structure. In practice
Member States are free to decide on the following:
whether to apply one or two reduced rates; whether to
apply, subject to special conditions, an extra ‘parking rate’;
the level of standard rate, as long as it is more than 15%;
the level of the reduced rate(s), subject to certain
Notes
26 Council Directive 2006/18/EC of 14 Feb. 2006, OJ L51, 22/2/2006, 12.
27 Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member States of the European Union, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 13, 2008. A summary of the results of the
study was then published in Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on VAT rates other than standard VAT rates, COM(2007) 380 final, 5
Jul. 2007.
28 Consultation Paper: Review of existing legislation on VAT reduced rates, TAXUD/D1D/24232, 6 Mar. 2008, at 2.
29 In addition to the legislation already mentioned, the following has also included some amendments to VAT rates provisions: Council Directive 92/111/EEC of 14 Dec.
1992, OJ L 384, 30/12/1992, 47; Council Directive 94/5/EC of 14 Feb. 1994, OJ L 60, 3/3/1994, 16; Council Directive 95/7/EC of 10 Apr. 1995, OJ L 102, 5/5/1995, 18;
Council Directive 96/42/EC of 25 Jun. 1996, OJ L170, 9/7/1996, 34; Council Directive 98/80/EC of 12 Oct. 1998, OJ L 281, 17/1/1998, 31; Council Directive 1999/49/
EC of 25 May 1999, OJ L 139, 2/6/1999, 27; Council Directive 2000/17/EC of 30 Mar. 2000, OJ L84, 5/4/2000, 24; Council Directive 2001/4/EC of 19 Jan. 2001, OJ L
22, 24/1/2001, 17; Council Directive 2002/38/EC of 7 May 2002, OJ L 128, 15/5/2002, 41; Council Directive 2005/92/EC of 12 Dec. 2005, OJ L51, 22/2/2006, 12–13;
Council Directive 2007/75/EC of 20 Dec. 2007, OJ L346, 29/12/2007, 13–14; and finally, with effect from 1 Jan. 2010, Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 Feb. 2008, OJ
L44, 20/2/2008, 11–22.
30 See n. 13 above, at 5.
31 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of value added tax, OJ L347, 11/12/2006, 1–118 (hereinafter ‘VAT Directive’).
32 The date until which this minimum standard rate level will apply has been consecutively postponed. This date currently stands at 31 Dec. 2015, see Council Directive
2010/88/EU of 7 Dec. 2010, OJ L326, 10/12/2010, pp 1–2.
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conditions, which depend on each Member State’s specific
circumstances; and to which goods/services to apply
reduced rates too, subject to the conditions set out in the
VAT Directive.33 Unsurprisingly, this freedom resulted
until recently in VAT rates structures within the EU
remaining highly discrepant, highly differentiated, and
highly complex. The high level of differentiation is
particularly worrying, since in itself will almost always
result in high level of discrepancy across Member States,
and unavoidably in high level of complexity.
Unfortunately, and until 2008, the rate differentiation
in EU Member States was particularly extensive. As
regards the ‘old’ Member States, six (Greece, Spain,
France, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg) applied a reduced
rate lower than the minimum laid down in Article 98 of
the VAT Directive (a ‘super-reduced rate’); three (Belgium,
Ireland, and Luxembourg) applied a reduced rate not lower
than 12% (the ‘parking rate’); five Member States
(Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, and Sweden) applied a
zero rate on a marginal and restricted basis; while Ireland
and the United Kingdom continued to make extensive use
of this derogation.34 The situation was slightly different
within the new Member States, but not radically so: six
(Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Malta, and
Slovakia) applied a zero rate of VAT, and almost all were
granted authorizations to introduce/maintain the
application of rates which derogated from Articles 98 and
99 of the VAT Directive.35 Member States’ application of
the labour-intensive services experiment was also a good
example of the discrepancies that can emerge in the
context of the application of reduced rates. In 2009, only
eighteen, out of then twenty-seven Member States,
submitted applications to avail of the option to apply
reduced rates to labour-intensive services. Of those
eighteen Member States, each of them had chosen different
services from the ones listed in the old Annex IV (now
part of Annex III): twelve had chosen renovation and
repairing of private dwellings; eight, small services of
repairing; six, domestic care services; seven, hairdressing;
three window cleaning and household cleaning services;
and one minor services of repairing clothing and
household linen.36 With the transformation of the labour-
intensive services experiment into a permanent feature of
the EU rates structure, as discussed above, this level of
differentiation looked more likely to increase, rather than
to decrease. Instead the financial and economic crisis hit,
and Member States approach to rate differentiation
changed radically.
2 EU VAT RATES: POST-2008
According to the OECD, after a period of relative stability
between 1996 and 2008, the average standard rate of VAT
started to rise again after 2008,37 and it now stands at
around 21.5%.38 Indeed between 1 January 2008 and 1
January 2014 many OECD countries increased their
standard and/or their reduced VAT rate, including – albeit
not exclusively – EU countries, as highlighted in Table 2
below. At the same time, as the table also demonstrates,
several EU Member States have also made substantial
amendments to their tax base, moving goods and services
from reduced to intermediate rate, or from reduced and
intermediate to standard rates. Overall a staggering
twenty-three, out of the twenty-eight EU countries,
changed their VAT rate structures during this period. Out
of the few Member States not to change their rates, one,
Germany, had also done so just one year beforehand,
increasing their standard rate by 3%. This is, of course,
not to say that there were no changes in the opposite
direction, namely lowering of rate levels, or narrowing of
the base, but as Table 3 demonstrates, these were
comparatively rare and circumspect.
Notes
33 The Commission has been publishing on an annual basis, a document listing the VAT rates applied to a range of products across the EU, VAT Rates Applied in the Member
States of the European Community. For an overview of the rates applicable before the economic and financial crisis see the document dated January 2008. See also A. Mathis,
VAT indicators, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 2, Apr. 2004.
34 The data was reported on the Commission’s report on reduced VAT rates, COM(2001) 599 final, 22 Oct. 2001, n. 17 above. An analysis of the rates in force on 1 Jan. 2009
shows that the situation had not improved and, if anything, it had worsened by then.
35 Articles 123–130 of the VAT Directive.
36 See Council Decision 2006/774/EC of 7 Nov. 2006, OJ L314, 15/11/2006, 28–32; and Council Decision 2007/50/EC of 30 Jan. 2007, OJ L222, 31/1/2007, 14–15.
37 See OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2012 – VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), at 15.
38 In the end of 2012 it stood at 21.6%, but it is likely to have increased since then, see VATlive, Global VAT rates on the increase – review the major changes, 23 Nov. 2012. See
also R. Asquith, ‘On the rise’ (2012) Taxation 169 (4341), 15.
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Table 2 Changes in VAT Rates in the Period 2008–2014
Increase of Rate Levels / Tax Base
Increase in
Standard
Rate
Increase in
Reduced
Rates
Base
Broadening
Measures
Bulgaria39 - 7%–9%
Croatia40 23%–25% 10%–13% Yes
Cyprus41 15%–19% -
Czech
Republic42
19%–21% 9%–15%
Estonia43 18%–20% 5%–9%
Finland44 22%–24% 8%–10%
France45 19.6%–20% 7%–10%
Greece46 19%–23% 4.5%–6.5%
9%–13%
Hungary47 20%–27% 15%–18% Yes
Ireland48 21%–23% - Yes
Italy49 20%–22% - Yes
Latvia50 18%–21% 5%–12%
Increase of Rate Levels / Tax Base
Increase in
Standard
Rate
Increase in
Reduced
Rates
Base
Broadening
Measures
Lithuania51 18%–21% - Yes
Luxembourg52 15%–17% - Yes
Malta53 - - Yes
Netherlands54 19%–21%
Poland55 22%–23% 3%–7%
5%–8%
Portugal56 20%–23% 5%–6%
12%–13%
Yes
Romania57 19%–24% - Yes
Slovakia58 19%–20% -
Slovenia59 20%–22% 8.5%–9.5%
Spain60 16%–21% 7%–10% Yes
UK61 17.5%–20% -
Notes
39 European Commission, VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Union – Situation at 1st July 2014, taxud.c.1(2014)2276174 – EN, 25/6/2014.
40 VATlive, Croatia raises VAT rate on restaurants and other services, 27 Sep. 2013; and VATlive, Further changes to Croatia VAT rules and rates, 4 Dec. 2013.
41 VATlive, Cyprus raises VAT to 19% by 2014, 11 Dec. 2012.
42 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Czech VAT rate to increase 1% to 21% in 2013, 2 Apr. 2012; and VATlive, Czech 1% VAT rise for 2013, 5 Dec. 2012.
43 European Commission, n. 39 above.
44 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Finland raises VAT from 23% to 24% in 2013, 24 Mar. 2012.
45 VATlive, Implementation of French VAT Rise to 20% from 1 Jan. 2014, 16 Dec. 2013; VATlive, France confirms 2014 VAT rise to 20%, 22 Nov. 2013; VATlive, French VAT rate
rises from 19.6% to 20% in 2014, 8 Nov. 2012; and VATlive, France to raise VAT rate on art from 7% to 10% Jan. 2014, 29 Aug. 2013.
46 European Commission, n. 39 above.
47 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Hungary raises VAT to 27% in 2012, 18 Sep. 2012; and VATlive, Hungarian VAT goes ahead without foodstuffs VAT cut, 8
Nov. 2013.
48 VATlive, Irish Finance Bill 2013 includes VAT measures, 4 Nov. 2013; and VATlive, Ireland raises VAT 2% to 23% from 1 Jan. 2012, 7 Dec. 2011.
49 VATlive, Italy to raise VAT 1% from 21% to 22% September 2011, 8 Sep. 2011; VATlive, Italy VAT rise to 22% proceeds 1st Oct 2013 as government teeters, 29 Sep. 2013; VATlive,
Italy increases VAT from 21% to 22% 1 July 2013, 12 Oct. 2013; and VATlive, Italian VAT rise has no effect on inflation figures, 5 Dec. 2013.
50 European Commission, n. 39 above.
51 VATlive, Lithuania new VAT rates and compliance simplifications, 5 Feb. 2013.
52 VATlive, Luxembourg VAT increase confirmation, 8 May 2013; and VATlive, EU Member States must broaden VAT base, 13 Oct. 2013; VATlive, Luxembourg VAT rise to 17% in
2015, 3 Feb. 2014.
53 European Commission, n. 39 above.
54 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Netherlands raises VAT from 19% to 21% October 2012, 1 May 2012.
55 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Poland increases VAT 1% to 23% January 2013, 7 Jul. 2010; and VATlive, Poland confirms 23% VAT rate till at least
2016, 4 Sep. 2013.
56 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Portugal raises VAT 1% to 21%, 15 May 2010; and VATlive, Portugal raises VAT 2% to 23% from January 2011, 1 Oct.
2010.
57 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Romania cuts VAT rate on bread, 10 Aug. 2013.
58 VATlive, Slovakia raises VAT 1% to 20% in January 2011, 8 Oct. 2010.
59 VATlive, Slovenia 2% VAT rate increase July 2013, 29 Mar. 2013.
60 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Spain raises VAT from 18% to 21% 1 September 2012, 4 Jul. 2012; and VATlive, EU Member States must broaden VAT base,
13 Oct. 2013.
61 VATlive, UK raises VAT 2.5% to 20% in 2011, 22 Jun. 2010.
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Table 3 Changes in VAT Rates in the Period 2009–2014
(Potential) Decreases in Rate Levels/Tax Base
Decrease
in
Standard
Rate
Decrease
in
Reduced
Rate
Increase in
Levels of
Differentiation
Base
Narrowing
Measures
Czech
Republic62
- - Yes -
Finland63 - 17% to
14%
- -
Greece64 - - - Yes
Hungary65 - - Yes -
Ireland66 - - - Yes
Romania67 - - Yes -
These numbers demonstrate the extent to which Member
States turned to VAT policy in the wake of the economic
and financial crisis. The reason is clear: confronted with
high budget deficits and limited (or negative) economic
growth, whilst at the same time deprived of the possibility
of currency devaluation and bound to a common interest
rate, Member States – specifically those which are part of
the Eurozone – were confronted with serious limitations
on their abilities to respond effectively; it was therefore
unsurprising that most turned to tax policy as their
preferred means of macro-economic intervention.68 Within
tax policy the weapon of choice seems to have been VAT.
This focus at national level on VAT policy in the
current economic climate is hardly surprising. Certainly it
comes within the context of the general trend for a long-
term shift towards indirect taxation, rather than direct
taxation. This trend is based largely on the traditional
economic view that consumption taxes are relatively more
efficient as a revenue source, are less distortive, and have
favourable effects on growth and employment. Thus, in
many Member States, VAT has become the main source of
national revenue: in 2009 it accounted for 21% of the tax
revenues of EU Member States, an increase of 12% since
1995. Against the background of the economic crisis,
however, these comparative advantages of VAT have
become particularly significant: on one hand, national
governments need additional revenue, and VAT presents
itself as a more reliable and stable source of revenue than
profits and income, especially during an economic
downturn; on the other hand, the emphasis is also on
economic growth as the only medium to long-term
solution, with less distortive taxes becoming particularly
appealing.
Having opted for VAT policy as an instrument to deal
with the effects of the economic and financial crisis,
Member States had the further choice of whether to raise
rates or broaden the tax base in order to raise further
revenue. As Table 2 demonstrates almost all Member
States opted for increase in rates, with some of these also
adopting base broad measures; only one Member State
adopted base broadening measures whilst not increasing
rates.
Clearly keen to harness the political momentum, the
European Commission presented in December 2010 the
Green Paper on the Future of VAT.69 The stated aim of the
paper, which was said to be ‘one of the most important
documents issued by the European Commission for some
time’,70 was to launch a broad-based consultation process
on the functioning of the current EU VAT system. Indeed,
whilst the paper itself was hardly as ambitious as that aim
might suggest, it was nevertheless far-reaching, covering
many – albeit not all – of the most problematic areas of
the system, including harmonization of rates. A year later,
amidst favourable reactions from other European
institutions and various stakeholders,71 the Commission
issued a follow-up Communication, which had two stated
purposes: in the long-term, to set out the fundamental
features of a future EU VAT system – a system which
Notes
62 VATlive, Czech Republic considers new reduced VAT rate, 19 Dec. 2013.
63 European Commission, n. 39 above.
64 VATlive, Greece wins reduction to restaurant VAT from 23% to 13%, 11 Jul. 2013.
65 VATlive, Hungary to debate 35% luxury rate this week, 17 Oct. 2013.
66 VATlive, Ireland reduces VAT on tourism until 2013, 2 Jun. 2012; and VATlive, Ireland extends 9% VAT subsidy on tourism and newspapers, 16 Oct. 2013.
67 European Commission, n. 39 above.
68 As A. J. Easson prophetically pointed out in 1993, ‘the fiscal implications of EMU are obvious and considerable. Of the three main instruments of economic policy, Member
States will soon relinquish all control over exchange rate policy and will gradually, over the next five years or so, lose much of their control over monetary policy. They will
thus be left with fiscal policy alone’, see Taxation in the European Community, European Community Law Series (London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1993),
at 18–19.
69 European Commission, Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, COM(2010) 695 final, 1 Dec. 2010. See also, Accompanying
document to the Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC (2010) 1455 final, 1 Dec.
2010.
70 R. Maas et al. ‘VAT Focus—Roundtable discussion: The Green Paper & the Future of VAT’ (2011) Tax J. 1094, 12.
71 See European Commission, Summary Report of the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system
(December 1, 2010-May 31, 2011), taxud.c.1(2011)1417007, 2 Dec. 2011; European Parliament, Report on the Future of VAT (2011/2082(INI)), Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs, A7-0318/2011, 30 Sep. 2011; European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on ‘Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more
robust and efficient VAT system’, 14 Jul. 2011, [2011] OJ C318/87; and European Commission, Future VAT System: pro-business, pro-growth, Press Release IP/11/1508, 6
Dec. 2011.
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continues to raise revenue but which also increases
competitiveness; and in the short to medium term, to list
the priority areas for further action in the coming years –
with a view to moving towards those objectives.72
Amongst these listed priority areas was the review of the
rate structure.
In the Communication, the Commission states that in
order to increase the efficiency of the VAT system, it
favours restricted use of reduced VAT rates. The use of
reduced rates should then be based upon a few guiding
principles:
(1) Abolition of those reduced rates which constitute an
obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal
market.
(2) Abolition of reduced rates on goods and services for
which the consumption is discouraged by other EU
policies.
(3) Similar goods and services should be subject to the
same VAT rate.
The Commission set out the aim of launching in 2012 an
assessment of the current VAT rates structure in the light
of these guiding principles, and subsequently make
proposals along those lines after ample consultation with
stakeholders and Member States by the end of 2013.73 In
this context it launched a public consultation in October
2012 on the review of the EU legislation on VAT reduced
rates.74 As opposed to previous initiatives which were
broad in their scope, this was a very targeted public
consultation: only nine questions, strictly framed by the
guiding principles, eight of which concerned specific
sectors of activity, namely the application of reduced rates
of VAT to water, energy, waste, and e-books. Despite the
limited scope of the questions asked, the Commission also
asked more generally for any ‘concrete examples of
distortions of competition within the internal market or of
specific problems encountered due to the current VAT
rules’. Despite this effective broadening of the scope of the
consultation, the targeted nature of the questions resulted
in a low number of submissions from academics, tax
advisors and tax practitioners; and on the contrary, a very
high number – more than half of all submissions – from
national or European associations, the large majority of
them representing sectors currently benefiting from a
reduced VAT rate.75 Unsurprisingly, the nature of the
respondents reflected heavily on the contents of the
responses: most were opposed to the abolition of the
reduced rates and/or advocating for their extension; and
many challenged the general trend of shifting taxation
away from labour towards consumption. Some submissions
also defended that no further harmonization should take
place, and that the decision on whether or not to apply
reduced VAT rates should be left to the Member States.
In the context of the outcome of this public
consultation, it is pertinent to question whether this latest
initiative can be successful. Reviewing the rate structure
has been part of every Commission’s attempt to reform the
EU VAT system – and with good reason. A recent study
commissioned by the EU Commission indicates that a
50% reduction in the dissimilarity in VAT rates structures
between Member States could result in a rise of 9.8% in
intra-EU trade and an increase in real GDP of 1.1%.76
Moreover, this is merely the last of several studies
indicating the negative consequences of rate
differentiation and its unproven positive effects. Yet, these
studies in themselves have traditionally been insufficient
to convince Member States to act. On the contrary, what
has now made many Member States act at a domestic level
has been the pressing need for extra revenue. Whilst no
reference is made to this reality in the Communication, it
is clear that the Commission is relying on that need in
order to push this measure forward – the fact that so many
Member States have already taken this political choice at
national level might just be enough to create the necessary
momentum for agreement at EU level.
This signals a significant shift in approach to VAT
harmonization by the European Commission. For the last
four decades, the Commission’s approach has been
primarily to convince Member States that harmonization
is an essential step for the establishment and the
functioning of the European Internal Market. Although
one can certainly agree with that statement,77 the reality is
that this approach has failed consistently to create the
necessary political enthusiasm for reform. In essence, it has
failed to rally the troops. The approach now adopted by
the European Commission is very different: there are
comparatively few references to the EU perspective, and
indeed there is only one reference in the entire Green
Paper on the Future of VAT to the ‘Internal Market’;
instead the focus is clearly on ‘consolidation of public
finances’ and ‘sustainable economic growth’. In the midst
Notes
72 Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single market, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, COM(2011) 851 final, 6 Dec. 2011.
73 Ibid., at 11–12.
74 European Commission, Review of existing legislation on VAT reduced rates, Consultation Paper, TAXUD/C1, October 2012.
75 European Commission, Review of Existing Legislation on VAT Reduced Rates, Summary Report of the Outcome of the Public Consultation (8 Oct. 2012–4 Jan. 2013),
taxud.c.1. (2013) 708070, 12 Apr. 2013.
76 See A Retrospective Evaluation of Elements of the EU VAT System — Final Report, TAXUD/2010/DE/328, FWC No. TAXUD/2010/CC/104, 1 Dec. 2011.
77 See R. de la Feria, n. 6 above.
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of the economic and financial crisis, the Commission has
clearly re-packaged long-sought reform by offering
Member States EU answers to national needs – and that is
why this time, it might just succeed.78 Furthermore, it
must also be acknowledged that the limited, or specific,
nature of the review now being considered may make it
politically easier to attain Member States’ agreement on.
This limited nature of the review, however, also raises
concerns namely on whether, even if successful, is this
proposed review worthwhile? Certainly it would result in
an improvement to the current EU VAT rate structure,
but not a massive one. Essentially, there is a trade of: lower
risks, lower returns; such are the costs of political realism.
3 BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM OF VAT RATES IN
EUROPE
Whether the latest European Commission’s initiative on
the review of the EU VAT rate structure gathers the
necessary support or not, it is clear that only limited
improvements to the structure can be achieved. Therefore,
if significant gains are to be attained, they must come
through a different route. In this context, would it be
possible to have significantly improved, even converging,
VAT rate structures in Europe, through national,
uncoordinated, action? How would such a VAT rate
structure look like, and how would it be achieved?
3.1 Ideal VAT Rate Structure
The case for differential tax rates under optimum
commodity taxation has been consistently made since the
elaboration in the 1920s of the inverse elasticity rule,
which suggests that economic efficiency is maximized by
taxing consumption goods at rates that are inversely
proportional to their price elasticity.79 In practice,
however, this rule raises various difficulties. Firstly, the
information required about consumers’ behaviour needed
to operate a differential tax system that improved
economic welfare would be so extensive as to make such
regimes impracticable: it would not only require estimates
of price-elasticities of every product on the market, but
also regular updates of those elasticities to take into
account changes in preferences and/or technology.80 The
rule also raises vertical equity concerns, since it suggests
higher tax rates on price-inelastic products, which are
typically basic goods that make up larger proportion of the
expenditures of low-income households.81 Finally,
application of this rule to take into account cross-price
elasticities, would suggest higher rates on products for
which high-income individuals tend to have a relatively
strong taste. However, cross-price elasticities are
particularly difficult to estimate, deeming implementation
of this rule even more complex.82
In any event, the VAT rates structures currently applied
in Europe do not reflect the inverse elasticity rule, but
quite the opposite with reduced rates applying primarily
to low elasticity products, such as food. As discussed
above, the original introduction of reduced VAT rates was
based not so much on clearly articulated policy objectives
but rather on pragmatic political goals, as designers of the
VAT sought to replicate the impact of the predecessor
turnover taxes and deflect concerns about the tax on
beneficiaries of previous concessions. Over time, however,
it was argued that the use of reduced rates achieves social
and distributional aims. This rationale for applying
reduced rates of VAT supports the characterization of the
use of these rates as tax expenditure. Indeed, whilst the
exact concept is controversial, tax expenditures are
generally defined as deviations from a tax norm or a
benchmark that result in a reduced tax liability for the
beneficiaries, who are generally a particular group of
taxpayers or an economic activity.83 What constitutes the
benchmark, insofar as VAT is concerned, involves an
element of judgment on what constitutes the normal VAT
tax base and rate, and consequently it may vary across
countries and over time.84 However, the use of reduced
rates for distributional and social reasons does fit the
general definition of tax expenditure, and therefore is
usually characterized as such – as opposed to tax
exemptions which are characterized by some EU countries
as part of their benchmark system.85
Once it is accepted that the application of reduced rates
amounts to tax expenditures, these should be subject to a
cost-benefit analysis similarly to direct expenditure
programmes: what are the benefits, and what are the costs
Notes
78 This point is developed further in R. de la Feria, ‘The 2011 Communication on the Future of VAT: Harnessing the economic crisis for EU VAT reform’ (2012) British Tax
Review 2, 119–133.
79 F. Ramsey, ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation’ (1927) Economic J. 37, 47–61. See also A.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, ‘The Structure of Indirect Taxation and
Economic Efficiency’ (1972) J. of Public Eco. 1, 97–119. For a comprehensive review of the literature on optimal commodity taxation theory see I. Crawford, M. Keen and S.
Smith, ‘Value-Added Tax and Excises’ in S. Adam et al. (eds.), Dimensions of Tax Design – the Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 275–422.
80 OECD, Choosing a Broad Base – Low Rate Approach to Taxation, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 19 (OECD Publishing, 2010), at 16.
81 Ibid.
82 P.B. Sorensen, ‘The Theory of Optimal Taxation: What is the Policy Relevance?’ (2007) International Tax and Public Finance 14, 383–406.
83 OECD, n. 80, at 39.
84 Ibid., at 39–40.
85 Ibid., at 50.
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of applying reduced VAT rates? Moreover, is increasing
VAT rates more effective in terms of both revenue and
economic growth, and to decrease/eliminate tax
expenditures?
3.1.1 What Are the Benefits of Applying Reduced
VAT Rates?
As discussed above, it has been argued that the use of
reduced rates achieves social and distributional aims, and
namely three rationales have been offered, as follows:
(1) Vertical equity: idea that these concessions limit the
natural regressivity of VAT, i.e., that the tax weights
more heavily on poorer households; so applying
reduced rates to key products such as food, energy,
healthcare, education, etc., would limit the impact of
this tax on those households.
(2) Positive externalities: idea that these concessions
increased consumption of so-called merit goods, such
as cultural events, books, sport activities, etc.
(3) Increase employment: idea that application of reduced
rates will ultimately lead to increase employment in
labour-intensive industries (e.g., hairdressing), or areas
where price is particularly elastic (e.g., electronics), or
both (e.g., restaurants).
The equity argument derives from the fact that the
proportion of income that is saved reduces as income
reduces, with the lowest income earners using all their
income for consumption and diverting none to savings. As
VAT falls only on income used for consumption and
exempts income that is applied to savings, the tax is said
to fall more heavily on lower income persons than on
higher income persons in terms of the proportion of
income derived by those persons.86 Reduced rates for
commodities that form a higher percentage of the
spending budget of lower income persons are seen as a way
of reducing the tax burden on these persons, and thus
increasing their consumption capability. This argument is
the rationale invoked for the application of reduced rates
to food, medication, utilities, etc.
The positive externalities rationale for reduced rates
derives from a belief that the market price for some types
of supplies does not fully reflect the overall benefits from
consumption of those supplies for society as a whole, and
thus government intervention to subsidize consumption of
those goods is deemed desirable. This argument is the
rationale invoked for the application of reduced rates to
books, cultural events, sports activities, etc.
The job creation argument has been developed
relatively recently, when compared with the other two
rationales for the use of reduced VAT rates. It derives from
the belief that price decreases resulting from the
introduction of reduced rates will lead to increase in
demand, which in turn will result in increased supply. In
labour-intensive services that increased supply will
necessarily lead to new job creation. This argument
attained political endorsement within the EU in the late
nineties, leading to the approval of the so-called labour-
intensive services experiment in 1999.
Crucially, these arguments – i.e., that application of
reduced rates contributes to vertical equity, increases the
consumption of merit products, and leads to job creation –
presuppose that the decrease in the VAT rate is reflected in
consumer prices. Theoretically, this should indeed be the
case: generally, in a competitive market if costs go down
(including taxes), so should prices. However, recent
empirical experiments with VAT rates seem to indicate the
opposite. The first and most significant has been the
labour-intensive services experiment discussed above. The
second experiment to assess the impact of reduced rates on
prices took place in Ireland. Struggling with high levels of
inflation, as a collateral effect of their outstanding
economic growth, Ireland decided to reduce the standard
VAT rate from 21% to 20% from January 2001. In a
speech in December 2000, the Irish Finance Minister
stated that: ‘The government expects to see the VAT
reduction passed on to the consumer and not absorbed in
higher retail margins. If this does not occur, the wisdom of
further VAT cuts will be placed in doubt. We will be
monitoring the situation and I hope consumers will be
vigilant in seeing that the VAT reduction is passed on to
them’. In 2002, Ireland decided to raise back the rate of
VAT from 20% to 21%. In a speech in December 2001,
the Finance Minister stated that the lower rate of VAT had
not been passed on to consumers: ‘I had reservations about
cutting that rate last year. I said that I would be looking
to see if it was fully passed on. I am not convinced that
this was the case.’87
How to explain this discrepancy between theoretical
and empirical results? A convincing explanation has yet to
be given. A study published in 2008 has suggested that
the empirical results of the labour-intensive services
experiment might be due to its temporary nature, i.e., if
firms know that a lower VAT rate is temporary, why would
they use time and money to expand production capacity
and incur costs if they have to revert to their previous
Notes
86 It has been argued that VAT is regressive with respect to income but not necessarily with respect to consumption, see S. Cnossen, ‘The Value-added Tax: Key to a Better Tax
Mix’ (1989) Australian Tax Forum 6(3), 265–281. For a general discussion on the regressive nature of VAT, or otherwise, see also G.N. Carlson and M.K. Patrick,
‘Addressing the Regressivity of a Value-Added Tax’ (1989) National Tax J. 42(3), 339–351; and N. Warren, ‘A Review of Studies on the Distributional Impact of
Consumption Taxes in OECD Countries’ (2008) OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Paper 64, June 2008, at 24.
87 See n. 20 above, at 26.
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production level within a few years.88 It is also possible
that, labour-intensive services do not operate in fully
competitive markets,89 and that a decrease of 1% in the
rate of VAT is too minimal to be passed on. Finally, it is
also worth noting that both experiments took place in a
boom economy, where it is possible that demand
outweighed supply. Yet, these are merely tentative
explanations: in practice, until definite arguments are
presented all that can be said with certainty is that
evidence so far does not support the argument that
reduced VAT rates reduce prices.
The recent changes to VAT rate structures, which took
place in various Member States since 2009, will offer new
opportunities for assessing the incidence of VAT, and the
impact of reduced rates on prices, in particular in the
context of a downturn economy.90 In fact some initial
examples, which took place in the beginning of the
economic crisis, are already available, appearing to add
support to the results of previous experiments.91 In 2009,
France dropped the VAT rate from 19.6% to 5.5% for
supplies of restaurant and catering services on the
assumption that restaurants would reduce prices
substantially, raise wages, or create new jobs, and improve
compliance. However, according to the French National
Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, the decrease
in prices for restaurant services was not minimal – around
1% – but also temporary. According to the French
authorities, if only 30% of the VAT cut had been passed
on to customer, this would create 6,000 jobs in the long
run, but the government stood to lose up to EUR 3 billion
in revenue in a full fiscal year from the cut; this would
equate to each new job in the sector costing French
taxpayers EUR 500,000. In 2010, Germany reduced the
VAT rate applicable to the hotel industry as part of a more
general tax cut. A recent survey indicated that the cut had
not been passed on to consumers, and instead prices had
remained the same.
If reduced VAT rates cannot reduce prices, then the
logical conclusion is that they cannot attain the
distributional and social aims that they are set up to
achieve. However, even if one assumes that the above
empirical results are flawed, and that indeed reduced rates
of VAT do affect prices, there are still no certainties that
distributional and social aims are, or can be, reached. A
recent empirical study seems to indicate that the
effectiveness of applying such rates depends on the
elasticity of specific products: in the case of basic goods,
such as food, consumers react only weakly to lower prices
(where consumption is price inelastic), so production and
employment will not increase significantly; in contrast, if
consumers react strongly to new prices, as in the case for
high value goods, such as package holidays, books, and
electronic equipment (where consumption is price elastic),
production and employment may increase significantly.92
Moreover, other economic studies have consistently shown
that since VAT is not an effective method of pursuing
distributional goals, and it is far better to tax as broadly as
possible,93 using the yield to compensate low-income
households.94 High-income households typically consume
more of basic necessities than low-income households. In
this context, if items currently subject to reduced rates
were fully taxed – personal income tax relief or means-
tested social security benefits – the government could
more effectively achieve social and distributional aims, and
have additional revenue left over to apply to other
redistributive programmes.95 In this sense, lower income
persons may be much worse off with a tax system that
contains reduced VAT rates designed to assist them, than
they would be in a tax system with one single-rate and
redistribution of the excess revenue raised under a more
neutral tax base. In addition, job creation or protection of
key sectors of the economy, would also be better achieved
through direct subsidies.
3.1.2 What Are the Costs of Applying ReducedVAT
Rates?
The benefits of applying reduced VAT rates are therefore
questionable. Moreover, the costs of subsidizing
consumption of target goods and services in this manner
are on the contrary likely to be significant.
The most obvious cost is revenue loss, which is
estimated to be substantial. The VAT tax expenditures, as
calculated by the OECD for 2007 on the basis of
Notes
88 See Copenhagen Economics, Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member States of the European Union, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 13, 2008, at 13.
89 For example, there might be geographical restrains, with only one hairdresser, or repair shop in a specific area.
90 For early studies on the effects of the VAT temporary standard rate reduction in the UK in 2009 see T. Crossley et al. ‘The Economics of a Temporary VAT Cut’ (2009) Fiscal
Studies 30(1), 3–16; R. Barrel and M. Weale, ‘The Economics of a Reduction in VAT’ (2009) Fiscal Studies 30(1), 17–30; and R. Blundell, ‘Assessing the Temporary VAT
Cut Policy in the UK’ (2009) Fiscal Studies 30(1), 31–38.
91 See A. Charlet and J. Owens, ‘An International Perspective on VAT’ (2010) Tax Notes International 59(12), 943, at 950.
92 See Copenhagen Economics, n. 88 above, at 12.
93 C.L. Ballard and J.B. Shoven conclude that differentiation of rates used to partially replace the income tax would do little to mitigate the adverse distributional impact of
the change, see ‘The Value-Added-Tax: The efficiency cost of achieving progressivity by using exemptions’ in M.J. Boskin (ed.), Modern Development in Public Finance: Essays
in Honor of Arnold Harberger (Oxford, B. Backwell, 1987), 109–129.
94 See OECD, n. 80, at 73.
95 Godbout and St. Gerny show that with tax credits targeted at lowest income individuals in place, the effective tax rate of consumption taxes increases with income, see ‘Are
Consumption Taxes Regressive in Quebec?’ (2011) Can. Tax J. 59(3), 463–493.
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countries’ tax expenditures reports and responses to a
questionnaire targeted at OECD delegates, was very
significant. In at least three EU Member States – namely
Italy, Spain, and the UK – the revenue forgone from those
expenditures amounted to more than one-third of total
VAT revenues.96 It is of course true that not all those
expenditures are connected with the application of reduced
rates, many will be related to the application of
exemptions. It is also true that the amount of revenue
forgone may not be exactly equal to the revenue that
would be actually obtained if the tax expenditures were
eliminated and the standard rate of VAT was to be applied;
it is likely that consumption will somewhat contract,
depending on the price-elasticities of the products in
question. However, the estimates on the level of VAT tax
expenditures present in EU Member States does provide a
rough indication of the revenue costs of applying reduced
rates in those countries. Another method of estimating the
revenue cost of applying reduced rates (and exemptions) is
the so-called VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR), which expresses
the revenue that would be raised if the standard VAT rate
was applied to all consumption. Using this method, the
OECD estimates that, between half and 1/3 of potential
revenues of its member countries are not subject to VAT
or, if they are, are not collected.97
Beyond the estimated revenue losses, however, applying
reduced rates of VAT raises significant other costs. From a
legal perspective application of reduced rates gives rise to
definitional and interpretative problems, and constitute an
incentive to engage in aggressive tax planning. For these
reasons reduced rates tend to result in substantial – and
increasing – litigation, which in turn results in substantial
compliance and administrative costs.98
Symptomatic of this increase in litigation is the number
of cases brought before the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) in relation to the application of
reduced rates by Member States to various goods and
services.99 At stake in many of these cases was the
application of reduced rates to specific products, whilst
other similar products were subject to standard rates. The
Court has consistently emphasized the importance of
respecting the principle of fiscal neutrality: the application
of reduced rates to certain products must be consistent
with this principle that precludes treating similar goods,
which are therefore in direct competition with each other,
differently for VAT purposes. In a recent case concerning
exemptions the Court has gone further in application of
the principle of fiscal neutrality by stating that Member
States cannot apply different VAT treatments to services
that are comparable to each other from the point of view of
the customer or meet the same needs of the customer.100
Following this decision the debate has been on whether
the new criteria will have implications for the Court
approach to VAT rates structures. Some have already been
defending that it will, stating that it is ‘highly likely’ that
the criteria laid down in Rank Group will affect the
application of VAT rates, particularly to food.101 The big
test should come soon with the eagerly expected decisions
in the e-books cases, where the Court has been called to
decide on whether e-books can be subject to reduced rates
of VAT similarly to hardcopy books.102
In the meantime, national courts too have been
struggling with similar difficulties, and in this regard,
United Kingdom court cases concerning food products are
particularly telling.103 In addition to highlighting
definitional and interpretative difficulties, these rulings
also demonstrate the pitfalls of attempting to attain
distributional and social aims through reduced rates:
certain food products were excluded from the scope of
application of the reduced rates because the UK legislator
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deemed these products as not fulfilling those
distributional and social aims; yet, similar products are
benefiting from reduced rates; the result being that the tax
system is de facto subsidizing those products, in detriment
of competing products. The consequences for fiscal
neutrality are obvious: treating competing products
differently for VAT purposes is bound to create distortions
to competition. In addition there might be unexpected
detrimental effects: some decisions, for example, would
have been likely to create an incentive to alter the
manufacturing of their products in order to benefit from a
reduced rate.
Whilst difficult to quantify, the costs of these
distortions of consumption and investment decisions may
be extremely significant. Reduced rates of VAT erode the
tax base, and importantly may subsidize inefficient
production – since the suppliers of products subject to
reduced rates do not have to compete on a level playing
field with suppliers of products subject to standard. The
results of the cost-benefit analysis as applied to reduced
VAT rates is therefore particularly negative: not only it is
unclear whether they accomplish any of the social and
distributional objectives that they set out to achieve, but
they also carry significant costs beyond the mere loss of
potential revenue.104 The result is a significant decrease in
efficiency of the tax, as measured by the IMF and the
OECD, which shows that European countries’ VAT
systems tend to rank below the OECD C-efficiency ratio,
average, which stands at 55 points out of 100 possible.105
The ideal VAT – at least insofar as higher income
countries are concerned – is therefore thought to be a
broad-based, single rate tax.106 This much has been
consistently defended by the OECD since the 1980s,107
and was recently supported by the European Commission
in the 2010 Green Paper on the Future of VAT. This has
also been the position of the IMF, which has recommended
the introduction of a single-rate VAT system to many
countries around the world.108
3.1.3 What Is the Ideal VAT (Standard) Rate?
The idea that tax revenue increases as tax rate increases
only up to a certain level – the maximum tax rate – and
that from that point onwards increases in the tax rate
actually lead to a decrease in tax revenue, was first
suggested in 1970s.109 Whether this u-shape effect,
known as the Laffer Curve, applies to VAT is not an
uncontested matter. Empirical evidence suggests that rate
increases does result in, both a decrease in average
propensity for consumption – or at least a decrease in the
formal economy – and an increase in non-compliance/
fraud, i.e., an increase in activities in the informal
economy.110 Whether those effects do result in the
existence of maximum rate in terms of revenue
maximization, however, is less clear.
Prior to 2008, it was suggested that indeed there was a
revenue maximizing rate for VAT, which stood at a range
between 18% and 19.3% in EU countries;111 more
recently, it has been estimated the VAT maximizing
revenue rate in those countries to be 22.5%.112 It is also
suggested that the maximum rate is different according to
business cycle, i.e., that it is slightly higher in low growth
years – this would be explained with changes in the
structure of consumption, as well as with VAT collection
effectiveness.113 However, both studies have
shortcomings.114 Moreover, latest evidence indicates that,
if there is a VAT Laffer Curve, the maximizing revenue
rate has not yet been achieved in EU countries, with
Member States still reporting increases in VAT revenue
intakes, despite the increase in rates to unprecedented
levels.
Whether increasing rates is the most effective way to
increase VAT revenues, nevertheless, is an entirely
different question. As discussed above, whilst most EU
Member States increased their standard rates in the last
five years, only a relatively small number extended their
VAT base. Yet, empirical evidences demonstrates the most
effective and immediate driver of changes in VAT revenues
is base broadening; changes in the standard rate, in
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contrast, directly account for a relatively small part of the
development in VAT revenues.115 Moreover, increases in
standard VAT rates may potentially amplify the
difficulties and distortions caused by reduced rates, if it
widens the gap between the two.
The ideal VAT is thought therefore, not only to be
broad-based, with a single-rate tax, but equally that rate
should also be low. Unfortunately, such a VAT rate
structure would be extremely difficult – if not impossible
– to implement in European countries. So the question is,
what would constitute an improved, achievable, VAT rate
structure in Europe.
3.2 Achievable VAT Rate Structure
In light of the above, any reform of national VAT rate
structures with a view to having a significantly improved
structure, must take in consideration various factors. First,
it must be acknowledged that, in the immediate term,
moving products from reduced to standard rate is likely to
have a significant economic impact, namely in the context
of the high standard rates applied in almost all Member
States, which mean that this move could represent as
much as a 20% or 15% tax hike. This economic impact
could be reflected in higher prices, which would hit the
poorest households the hardest, or in increased
unemployment/low salaries: one can imagine that in price
inelastic sectors, such as food or utilities, prices will most
likely increase;116 in other price elastic sectors, where an
increase in price might lead to a considerable contraction
in consumption, suppliers may opt to maintain prices, but
will need instead to decrease costs, which in a labour-
intensive sector, such as restaurant services or tourism,
would lead to job loses.
Secondly, it must be accepted that in the current
financial environment that most European countries find
themselves in – and not just the ones which benefited
from a bail-out agreement – in the context of problematic
budget deficits, and significant financial restrains, the
likelihood of introduction of measures at personal income
tax or social security level, to compensate the VAT hike, is
small at best. This concern was indeed expressed by several
respondents to the European Commission’s latest public
consultation on review of reduced rates: in the current
economic climate respondents expressed fear that there
might be no national compensating measures, or that they
would be insufficient.117
Third, any reform of nationals VAT rate structures must
take into consideration EU law limitations. As opposed to
exemptions, application of reduced rates under the VAT
Directive is non-compulsory, i.e., the Directive establishes
maximum standards of differentiation – number of rates,
number of products to which reduced rates can be applied
– but does not establish a minimum level of
differentiation; Member States are free to apply reduced
rates to as limited number of products as they wish, and
ad extremis are even free to apply only one rate. Therefore,
extension of the VAT base through elimination of reduced
rates is not subject to any EU law limitations. However,
the implementation of compensatory measures may be; in
particular, the freedom to introduce measures to
compensate labour-intensive or key economic sectors for
the increase in VAT rates in might be severely reduced.
Within the EU, national subsidies to specific industries,
either in the form of tax relief/incentives or direct
subsidies, are limited by state aid law.118
Finally, the long-running history of European failed
attempts to harmonize VAT rate structures, is indicative of
the political difficulties in reforming this area of the tax
system. Aside from the well-known specific European
dynamics at force, such unanimity voting – which can be
bypassed by national, unilateral action – it must also be
acknowledged that opposition to reform in this area may
be partially explained by the theory of status quo bias,
which lies behind the opposition to abolition of
preferential tax regimes more generally.119
In light of the above limitations, what would be
suitable criteria for better, more efficient, more neutral,
yet achievable, European VAT rate structures?
3.2.1 Criteria for Reform of EuropeanVAT Rate
Structures
In terms of the VAT base, four criteria are proposed, as
follows.
Criterion 1: Elimination of application of reduced rates of
VAT, where the rationale for its application is the creation of
positive externalities and/or correction of externalities. There are
various arguments to support this criterion. First, it is
notoriously difficult (and subjective) to attach positive
externalities to specific products; for example, few may
argue against the positive externalities of reading, yet do
all books or magazines hold positive externalities? Do
celebrities’ biographies, or astrology books? And even if
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so, are these potential positive externalities sufficient to
justify a government subsidy? Different people will hold
different views. Second, goods or services which are
usually perceived as holding positive externalities, such as
books or cultural events, are statistically much more likely
to be consumed by high-income households. So that
applying reduced rates to these products constitutes a de
facto subsidy from poor-income to high-income
households, thus holding negative distributional effects. It
has been argued that the maintenance of reduce rates for
these products has an aspirational value. Even if that is the
case, is it legitimate to ask low-income households to
subsidize attendance to theatre plays, or the opera, by
high-income households? Third, these products are by
nature price elastic, so it is unclear to what extent prices
will be affected by a VAT rate increase. It is possible that
there will be an effect on employment, in the context of a
possible need to decrease costs, but it is worth keeping in
mind that these are not usually labour-intensive industries
for unqualified workers, but quite the opposite: they tend
to employ small number of qualified workers. Finally, in
the context of the current financial and economic crisis,
encouraging the consumption of products which hold
positive externalities is hardly a priority.
Criterion 2: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of
VAT where the rationale for its application is vertical equity.
The basis for this criterion is the low price elasticity of
these products; prices will most likely increase, hitting
low-income households hardest. However, given that
high-income households consume considerably more of
these products, it makes sense to limit the application of
reduce rates to those categories of goods and services
which are truly essential, such as food.
Criterion 3: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of
VAT where its elimination would have a serious impact on
industries which are either labour-intensive or key for economic
recovery. The arguments in favour of maintaining reduced
rates for these sectors are based on keeping
competitiveness of national products in the international
market, and employment concerns. In principle the tax
hike could be absorbed by suppliers by decrease in their
margins, but considering the size of the hike it is likely
that at least part of the increase will have to be passed on
to consumers in higher prices, or to employees in lower
salaries/job losses. Both options carry economic risks for
key sectors of the economy and those which are labour-
intensive: if passed on in higher prices there is a risk of
decrease competitiveness for exporting sectors of the
economy, which in labour-intensive sectors can have the
added effect of raising unemployment; even for non-
exporting sectors, if price elastic, it is more likely that the
VAT hike would be passed on employees, as increase in
prices would lead to contraction in consumption, and then
again there would be a significant risk of job losses.
Criterion 4: Rationalisation of categories of goods and services
to which reduced rates of VAT apply, by eliminating distinctions
within categories, and limiting the use of different rates to
different products within the same category. Distinctions
within categories are the main sources of interpretative
and definitional difficulties; elimination of these
distinctions would therefore lead to higher legal certainty,
be a disincentive to planning, abuse and fraud, and
decrease significantly the potential for litigation – all of
which would in turn result in lower compliance and
administrative costs. Elimination of distinctions would
also avoid other economic distortions, such as product
manipulation so as to avail of the reduce VAT rate.
3.2.2 How to Reform EuropeanVAT Rate Structures
Whilst the economic case for VAT base broadening has
been often done by the European Commission – and many
academics – the persuasiveness of the economic case has
clearly been insufficient to secure political support. As
discussed above, this is undoubtedly partially due to the
difficulties in approving EU legislation; however, EU
legislative procedure dynamics alone do not explain the
fact that, until recently, VAT base broadening measures
have also been relatively rare at national European level. A
better explanation for it may be the existence of status quo
bias.
Broadening the VAT base means essentially moving
from an existing tax regime, towards a new one; adoption
of such measures requires, therefore, overcoming the status
quo bias. This bias means that voters will impose more
conditions to move from status quo A to a new tax system
B, than to remain in A.120 The bias can be explained by
creation of losers and winners, uncertainty, and imperfect
information. Any tax reform process necessarily results in
losers and winners, and broadening of VAT is no
exception. Those that had been so far benefiting from the
existence of reduced rates will naturally loose with the
reform; they are easily identifiable, compared to the
second group of most taxpayers that stand to gain (perhaps
only marginally), and they have a strong incentive to
lobby hard against the reform, in contrast with the
winners, who are often silent.121 Additionally, the reform
process itself may create uncertainty, which will be
aggravated by voters’ lack of understanding of the tax
system (imperfect information). On VAT specifically, it has
been suggested that the main cause of the unpopularity of
broadening-base measures is the imperfect information on
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the potential revenue and redistributional impact of these
base broadening measures.122
The status quo bias means in practice that a pure
economic argument, focussing on efficiency gains, may not
be sufficient to obtain the political agreement necessary
for the adoption of VAT base broadening measures,
according to the above proposed criteria. Overcoming this
bias may require EU Member States to consider others
factors regarding the form and timing of the reform.
In terms of form, it has been suggested as a solution to
circumventing the status quo bias, to pursue gradual
reforms, by splitting the reform intro different
components, and to explicitly link the abolition of
preferential tax treatments that only benefit some
taxpayers – such as application of reduced rates to specific
products – with the introduction of tax measures from
which most taxpayers will gain.123 As discussed above,124
both these approaches have been tried within the EU for
the reform of VAT rates, with no success. More promising
is the suggestion that base broadening measures may be
more acceptable if bundled; when elements are viewed in
isolation, and the debate focus on particular goods, the
status quo may be seen as genuinely redistributive, which
may prevent voters from supporting the reform.125 The
EU experience seems to confirm this view. Moreover,
international constraints, such as those emerging from the
IMF or the European Commission, may also assist in the
introduction of unpopular reforms,126 as the experience
post-2008 in countries subject to bail-out demonstrates.
Insofar as timing for the introduction of base
broadening measures, whilst it is difficult to definite the
right moment, quick reforms appear to be the most
effective.127 Not only there is a possibility that the
announcement might change the behaviour of economic
operators,128 but equally it may encourage the
mobilization of those that will lose out with the reform to
lobby (harder) for the maintenance of the status quo.
3.2.3 Portuguese 2012 VAT Reform
The above proposed base broadening criteria were used as
a basis for the Portuguese VAT rate structure reform in
2012, which through strategic designed form and timing
was able to overcome the status quo bias. Under the bail-
out agreement signed with the EU and the IMF in 2011,
Portugal was required to reform its VAT, which was
deemed to be highly inefficient and if reformed offered
potential to help the Portuguese Government reduce its
budget deficit. The required reform, based on the above
criteria, was implemented in the 2012 State Budget, and
it resulted in the following key changes to the existing
rate structure:
(1) Cultural events, sports activities and environmentally
friendly products were moved from the reduced and
intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of
criterion 1).
(2) Non-essential food and beverages, take-away and
restaurant services were moved from the reduced and
intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of
criterion 2).
(3) Hotel accommodation and tourism-related services, as
well as agricultural inputs have been kept at reduced
and intermediate rates (on the basis of criterion 3).
(4) Distinctions within categories of foodstuff have been
eliminated, so that specific categories are either
subject to reduced or to standard rates (on the basis of
criterion 4).
The reform resulted in a 30 points reduction in tax
expenditure, as well as a significant increase in the C-
efficiency level, which before the reform stood at 44
points.129 Consumption contracted significantly; however,
until reliable price data is available, it is difficult to
dissociate the extent to which the contraction resulted
from the VAT base broadening, from the contraction that
it would have happen as a result of the economic and
financial crisis regardless of any tax hikes. Consequently
VAT revenue has increased, but at lower levels than
expected.
Despite the somewhat disappointing short-term results
in terms of revenue collected, the Portuguese reform of the
VAT rate structure was broadly complimented by the EU
and the IMF. The IMF Country Report on Portugal at the
time of the reforms stated that as a result of these the VAT
tax base levied at the standard rates was enlarged from
60% to 80% of the total base, which would generate
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savings of about 1.2% of GDP.130 The report from the
European Commission referred to additional revenues of
1.4% of GDP, stating:
Following past increases in the VAT rates, the 2012
budget focused mostly on broadening the tax base […]
In order to protect vulnerable groups, many essential
goods remain subject to the 6% reduced rate and this
rate also continues to be applied to goods considered
crucial for domestic production, such as wine. Overall,
the measures will help to significantly increase VAT
efficiency.131
The success of these measures – even if more limited than
expected – allowed the Portuguese Government to focus
on introducing amendments to the VAT legislation to
promote growth, in particular by helping small and
medium-sized businesses, in the 2013 State Budget.
Measures introduced included the simplification of the
bad debts regime, and a cash-flow tax accounting scheme
for companies with turnover below EUR 500,000.
4 ACHIEVING BROAD-BASED VAT(S) IN
EUROPE
EU agreement on reduced VAT rates is difficult to achieve;
and even if achievable, it will result in only minor
improvements to the current EU VAT rate structure. In
this context it is necessary to consider whether it would be
possible to have significantly improved VAT rate
structures in Europe, through national, uncoordinated,
action. Implementation of an ideal VAT by Member States
– i.e., a single-rate system with compensatory measures
low-income households, and key sectors of the economy –
is conditioned by political constrains present in most
European countries, as well as significant budgetary
limitations. Moreover, the form and timing of the reform
is not indifferent, the presence of status quo bias means that
EU Member States must consider the best strategy to
overcome that bias.
The criteria proposed here for reform of national VAT
rate structures will not result in the best VAT possible,
but rather in the best VAT Member States can possible
have given the circumstances. A broader-based VAT,
which will result in increased revenue, decreased
administrative and compliance costs, and less
susceptibility to fraud, avoidance and planning; overall a
more efficient, more neutral VAT. In the process the holy
grail of EU VAT might be finally attained: decreased
divergence and even approximation of VAT rates
structures across the EU. Not through a process of EU
harmonization, but instead through a process of natural
convergence of national VAT policies – a rare case of
significant gain, with limited pain.
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